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Abstract 
In the field of offender corrections, a preoccupation with risk prediction has come at the 
expense of explanation, and an overemphasis on risk factors has come at the expense of 
understanding protective factors. Some strides have been made in describing and categorising the 
types of factors that protect young people from a life of crime, or promote competencies and 
potentials that help them avoid it altogether. We argue, however, that like the field of dynamic risk 
factors, we know very little about the nature and function of these features, beyond describing them. 
The article describes theory and research associated with expertise and its qualities and value as 
both a risk and a protective factor in the prevention of crime. It draws from literature in forensic 
psychology, criminology, resilience and neuroscience. 
 




 Knowledge of the link between protective factors and offending is crucial to understanding 
why some individuals continue to offend whilst others desist from offending, or never begin despite 
considerable adversity and risk in their backgrounds. However, the notion of ‘protection’ has been 
hugely neglected within the domains of forensic and criminal psychology. Actuarial risk 
assessment, which is vital to criminal justice practice and offender management, and the 
prominence of the Risk-Need-Responsivity model of offender rehabilitation (Andrews, Bonta & 
Wormith, 2006), has led academics and practitioners in these fields to focus on the risk that an 
individual poses to either themselves or other members of the public (Beech, Fisher, & Thornton, 
2003). When assessing risk, static risk factors (i.e. historical, unchangeable features, such as 
number of previous convictions or age of first conviction) and dynamic risk factors (i.e. changeable 
features, such as emotional dysregulation or poor coping skills) are measured to calculate the 
likelihood that an individual will reoffend (Bonta, 1996): The more risk factors that are present, the 
more likely the offender will offend again. Whilst focusing on risk is important for protecting the 
individuals themselves, the public and those working in legal and correctional facilities (Andrews & 
Bonta, 2003), it does mean that those factors associated with protecting the individual from 
reoffending have been ignored despite having huge implications for offender intervention, 
management and treatment. Such factors are referred to as Protective Factors. Over recent years, 
academics and practitioners in the fields of forensic psychology and criminology have started to 
explore this notion of ‘protection’ by considering those factors that might reduce rather than 
increase the likelihood of an individual reoffending. An interesting topic of theory and research 
with a wealth of robust experimental research to support it, and which has interesting implications 
for both increasing ‘protection’ and risk is that of expertise. In this article, we will first discuss the 
nature of protective factors, arguing that they are qualities or traits that are inherently positive 
within the individual and are not just factors that mitigate risk. We will highlight that the issues 
associated with conceptualising protective factors are similar to those associated with 
conceptualising dynamic risk factors (see Vernham & Nee, 2015 for a review). We will then turn to 
a consideration of expertise and its unique status as potentially both a risk and protective factor.  
Finally, the article will discuss the implications of expertise and protective factors for rehabilitation 
and desistance. 
  
What are protective factors?  
 Identifying and addressing the predictors of offending is important for prevention and 
intervention, with risk factors traditionally being the focus.  However, this risk-based approach to 
rehabilitation and treatment is very much deficit-focused; hence, there is an emphasis on the 
individual’s problems and little consideration of the individual’s strengths (Maruna & LeBel, 2003; 
Willis & Ward, 2013). The focus on deficits can have negative consequences for an offender and 
result in them being unmotivated to engage in treatment, leading to increased reoffending rates 
(Wilson & Yates, 2009). As a result, many researchers (e.g. de Vogel, de Vries Robbé, de Ruiter, & 
Bourman, 2011; de Vries Robbé, de Vogel, & de Spa, 2011; Salekin & Lochman, 2008; Thornton, 
2013; Ttofi, Farrington, Piquero & DeLisi, 2016; Ward & Maruna, 2007) have urged criminal 
practitioners to re-align this risk-based approach and to consider balancing the assessment of risk 
with the assessment of an individual’s strengths (i.e. criminal practitioners need to consider the 
individual’s protective factors). The inclusion of protective factors in assessment and treatment is 
important because: (1) research shows that combining risk factors (deficits) and protective factors 
(strengths) improves the predictive validity of assessments compared to when risk factors alone are 
measured (de Vries Robbé, de Vogel, & Douglas, 2013; Lodewijks, de Ruiter & Doreleijers, 2010); 
(2) a biased focus on risk can lead to over prediction of risk and poor risk management and 
treatment planning (Rogers, 2000); and (3) a focus on deficits can be stigmatising to individuals and 
lead to a negative relationship between the assessor and assessee (Attrill & Liell, 2007).  
Although risk factors can predict crime, protective factors can promote desistance or the 
prevention of the criminal career beginning at all; thus, can also be predictive of recidivism 
(Thornton, 2013). The notion of protection developed from the concept of resilience. An individual 
can be deemed as resilient if they experience adverse events (e.g. child neglect or sexual abuse) but 
do not develop maladaptive coping strategies and behaviours (e.g. depression, anxiety, violent 
offending; Masten, 2001). This leads to the following question: ‘Why is it that out of a group of 
individuals who experience similar adverse backgrounds only some develop a healthy level of 
functioning, whilst others develop a harmful level of functioning’? Resilience is believed to be 
fostered by protective factors (Mrazek & Mrazek, 1987), individual characteristics which function 
to protect individuals from the negative outcomes typically associated with a dysfunctional 
background. However, instead of describing a list of protective factors thought to contribute to 
resilience (e.g. trustful and forgiving character, self-control, stable caregiving, supportive family, 
positive peer networks; Afifi & MacMillan, 2011), we should instead be examining how and why 
such factors help only some individuals manage in the face of adversity.  
The evidence regarding the impact of protective factors against crime is far less well 
established than the evidence for risk factors (Tolan, 2000). At present, there is no universal 
definition of ‘protective factors’ nor is there a consensus amongst researchers about how protective 
factors relate or interconnect with risk factors. Some researchers say protective factors are the 
absence (Costa, Jessor & Turbin, 1999) or ‘mirror image’ of risk factors (White, Moffitt, & Silva, 
1989), whilst others state that protective factors are variables that interact with risk factors to nullify 
their effects (Rutter, 1985) or are variables that predict low probability of offending among a high 
risk group (Werner & Smith, 1982). 
In recent years, scholars have started to discuss what protective factors might entail in a 
more detailed way. In 2014, de Vries Robbé developed a model which attempted to explain four 
key mechanisms in which protective factors have an impact: (1) The risk reducing effect, which 
advocates that some protective factors reduce risk factors directly; (2) The moderator or buffering 
effect, which advocates that protective factors lessen the strength of the relationship between a risk 
factor and offending as opposed to changing the risk factor directly; (3) The main effect, which 
advocates that protective factors have a general positive effect (rather than influencing specific risk 
factors) and thus offer overall protection leading to a reduction in reoffending; and (4) The 
motivator effect, which advocates that protective factors have a positive influence on each other, so 
that specific protective factors enhance or facilitate the development of other protective factors. 
However, problems do arise from de Vries Robbé’s model of protection because, whilst it is 
beneficial in terms of risk-prediction, it fails to incorporate an explanatory component. It does not 
tell us about the nature of protective factors, only what they might do. The model does not explain 
why individuals continue to offend or desist from offending; hence, it has very little impact on 
offender intervention and treatment. This lack of explanation is also an issue with the current 
categorisation and definition of dynamic risk factors (Vernham & Nee, 2015). At present, dynamic 
risk factors are merely a list of factors that increase risk, with no conceptualisation of the underlying 
casual mechanisms and how such factors increase the likelihood of reoffending. If we have no 
explanation of how and why risk factors increase risk of reoffending and we have no understanding 
of how and why protective factors decrease risk of reoffending, then all that remains are lists of 
factors that are indicators or predictors of recidivism. Furthermore, this current lack of explanation 
with regard to the underlying causal mechanisms of offending behaviours in terms of risk and 
protective factors means that developing an understanding of how protective and risk factors 
interact with one another is, at present, impossible.  
Similar to the categorisation of risk factors, it is possible to distinguish between static 
protective factors (e.g. secure childhood attachment or intelligence) and dynamic protective factors 
(e.g. positive coping strategies or good self-control). However, in 2016, researchers further 
categorised protective factors into: Promotive factors (variables that have a direct influence on 
desistence regardless of risk level, e.g. healthy brain development, low neuroticism and having a 
few good friends rather than numerous acquaintances), risk-based protective factors (variables that 
predict low probability of offending amongst individuals at risk, e.g. low daring, high school 
attainment, intelligence), and interactive protective factors (variables that moderate the impact of 
risk factors; hence, when a risk factor is present, the probability of offending decreases in the 
presence of a protective factor, for example; high verbal and nonverbal intelligence, high school 
achievements, high parental interest in education function against poor child-rearing; good parental 
supervision functions against high dishonesty; and high family income acts as a protective factor 
against a convicted parent; see Farrington, Ttofi & Piquero, 2016; Jolliffe, Farrington, Loeber & 
Pardini, 2016; Ttofi, Farrington, Piquero & DeLisi, 2016; Ttofi, Farrington, Piquero, Lösel, DeLisi 
& Murray, 2016). Despite much support for this latter classification of protective factors, more 
research is needed into promotive, risk-based and interactive protective factors in order to truly 
explain their relationship to offending behaviours and the trajectory to crime. Again, and similar to 
that mentioned above, we need to deconstruct the term ‘protective factors’ to further understand the 
underlying causal mechanisms and how they function to reduce reoffending.  
When predicting risk of offending, a lot more is understood about the onset of offending as 
opposed to the termination of offending.When thinking about those factors that protect an 
individual, it is important to consider ‘desistence’ (the process of no longer committing offences 
amongst those individuals who have previously engaged in a continuous pattern of offending; 
Maruna, 2001). After all, it is protective factors that contribute most to desistence. Desistence is a 
long-term challenging maintenance process that involves the slow recognition of a need to change, 
some motivational fluctuations, and some false starts followed by lapses or relapses (McNeill, 
Farrall, Lightowler, & Maruna, 2012). To try to understand what promotes desistence from 
offending, a range of factors and mechanisms have been examined. Some researchers argue that 
aging causes desistence; thus offenders merely ‘grow out of it’ (e.g. Glueck & Glueck, 1940). 
However, such an explanation does not explain how or why such a change takes place; hence, if we 
are to truly understand the ‘aging effect’ then we need to consider the wide range of variables that 
constitute aging, such as biological changes, social transitions and life experiences, and learn how 
these variables relate to desistence (Rutter, 1996; Sampson & Laub, 1992; Sutton, 1994). Other 
factors found to be linked to desistence include; stable employment, completing schooling, 
marriage, lack of stress, sobriety, good mental health, optimism and hope, joining the military, 
sense of achievement, strong self-worth, meaningful relationships, and parenthood (Farrington, 
Gallagher, Morley, St. Ledger, & West, 1986; Laub & Sampson, 2001; LeBel, Burnett, Maruna, & 
Bushway, 2008; Leibrich, 1993; Maruna, 2001; Sampson & Laub, 2005). However, individual 
differences must be considered: The same social experience can affect individuals in different ways 
depending on gender, age, previous experiences, race, and personality variables such a 
conscientiousness and agreeableness (Cowan, 1991; Graham & Bowling, 1995; Miller & Lynam, 
2001; Rutter, 1996). Additionally, the motivations and internal processes of each individual will 
have an impact on whether particular factors lead to desistence. For example, stable employment 
does not cause desistence, but stable employment with commitment to the job is believed to do so 
(Sampson & Laub, 1993). Hence, we cannot just list factors that protect the individual and promote 
desistence from crime. Instead, we must consider how the individual as a whole desists from crime 
by considering how these descriptive categories associated with desistance relate to individual 
internal processes. 
Evidence from the desistence literature clearly emphasises the importance of identifying 
people’s strengths if the desistence process is to occur. By focusing on why and how some 
individuals succeed (i.e. the protective factors) and no longer focusing on why and how some 
individuals fail (i.e. the risk factors), desistence research can help to implement new understandings 
for offender assessment and treatment (de Vries Robbé, Mann, Maruna & Thornton, 2015). 
However, this can only occur if we stop providing lists of factors that protect individuals from 
reoffending and start providing explanations of how and why such factors protect individuals from 
reoffending. A greater understanding of how the protective factors can be used to overcome 
obstacles to desistence will encourage criminal justice practice to start supporting and developing 
these positive attributes within offenders (Maruna & LeBel, 2003, 2009). 
 To summarise, the reliance on measuring risk factors as correlates of recidivism is 
misleading and means that the focus of assessment and treatment is on the offender’s ‘problems’ 
and not on the offender’s ‘positive attributes and qualities’. It is extremely helpful that scholars are 
now beginning to examine the latter by defining protective factors and unpicking their meaning 
(e.g. in the special issue by Ttofi et al., 2016). After all, the incorporation of such factors improves 
the predictive validity of risk assessments and is more attractive to communities (Pollard, Hawkins 
& Arthur, 1999). However, research now needs to continue to examine the notion of ‘protective 
factors’: Evidence shows that in their current format, protective factors are not ‘mirror images’ of 
risk factors or causes of desistence, but instead are indicators of reduced recidivism or predictors of 
desistence. If protective factors are to have causal links then future research needs to explore more 
thorough conceptualisations of protective factors that have more explanatory value. That is, in order 
for protective factors to hold any meaning, we need to understand how they have an effect on 
recidivism and desistance. One factor that has previously been discussed as a dynamic risk factor is 
expertise (Vernham & Nee, 2015). However, this factor could also be a protective factor and thus 
will be the focus of the next part of this article.  
 
What is expertise and how might it develop in individuals? 
Expertise refers to the skills and knowledge an individual develops through learning and 
concerted practice in a particular domain that makes them distinguishable and obviously superior 
from those new to that domain (i.e. the novice). The kind of expertise discussed in this article refers 
to a continuum of expertise (Chi & Bassok, 1989; Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton & Klein, 1995) with 
novices at one end and masters at the other. Most individuals have the ability to develop expertise in 
some domains (for instance, many of us go from novice to expert in relation to driving a car), but it 
is rare for individuals to reach the extreme end of proficiency, except through continual, deliberate 
and challenging practice (Ericsson, 1996). Expertise in a given field can be conceptualised as both 
structural representations in memory and their behavioural manifestations.  
  There is a large and long-established body of literature and research devoted to 
understanding the cognitive processes associated with the development of expertise, involving 
numerous domains (for example, chess players, pilots, doctors, typists, and firefighters to name but 
a few; see Vicente & Wang, 1998 for a review). Others have noted processes and features which 
unify experts, whatever their domain (Feltovich, Prietula & Ericsson, 2006; Nee & Ward, 2015; 
Palmeri, Wong & Gauthier, 2004). Key aspects include; the development of dense and inter-
connected cognitive schemas in long-term memory; automaticity in decision-making and behaviour; 
selective preconscious attention; and heightened situational awareness of cues relevant to their 
domain of expertise (these will each be briefly described below, but for a fuller account see Nee & 
Ward, 2015). These four distinguishing features allow the expert to undertake faster, automatic and 
cognitively more economical decisions in relation to their less experienced peers, regardless of 
which area of expertise is under examination.  
As a novice begins to practice a skill they are eventually to become expert at (e.g. learning 
to play the piano), through trial and error they become increasingly attuned to the cues (e.g. 
visual/auditory; external/internal) in their environment that represent successful choices and 
decisions, and also those that are less useful and should therefore be ignored. As skill builds, the 
individual begins to chunk together in memory these patterns of recognition and knowledge about 
how to respond (in this case to the sheet music), allowing them to play more quickly and efficiently. 
These memory structures or patterns about how to behave are known as cognitive schemas 
(Shanteau, 1992) and they become richer and more inter-connected as practice ensues. Decades of 
experimental and interview research on, for instance, chess players (De Groot, 1946; Gobet & 
Simon, 1996), diagnostic expertise in doctors (Norman, Eva, Brooks & Hamstra, 2006), and 
computer programmers (Barfield, 1997) has shown that the recall processes used by these experts 
are faster, more detailed and more strategy orientated compared to control groups.  
Another well-established idea is that as an individual becomes well-practiced at a skill, it 
becomes automatic and beneath explicit consciousness (e.g. being able to drive without thinking 
about it; being able to play a tune without instructing oneself which notes to play). Robust 
experimental evidence has indicated that automaticity has four distinct features (the process should 
be unintentional, outside awareness, uncontrollable and highly resource-efficient) and often requires 
thousands of repeated learning episodes (Shiffrin & Shneider, 1977). More recent scholars have 
noted that consciousness is a continuum and some aspects of a thought-processing episode (e.g. 
deciding to make a trip somewhere) will be conscious, while other more routine aspects (actually 
driving the car there) will be mostly below consciousness (Bargh, 1994; Norman et al., 2006).  
Other key aspects of expertise include selective preconscious attention and heightened 
situational awareness of cues in the environment. Bargh and his colleagues have eloquently 
described the preconscious automatic processes that develop with learning and practice in any 
domain, allowing the individual to unconsciously scan the environment for triggers associated with 
reward or threat (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trotschel, 2001). Evidence from 
experimental psychology indicates that these processes, which from an evolutionary point of view, 
are linked to self-preservation, allow an “eternal vigilance” (Bargh, 1994, p. 5), and are “chronically 
accessible” (Bargh, 1994, p. 4; i.e. they are permanently functioning processes that are very 
difficult, if not impossible, to ‘turn off’).  
All-in-all, the four features associated with expertise allow for; increasingly accurate, 
automatic and unconscious recognition of relevant stimuli and instantaneous action (Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Logan, 1988); faster coding of familiar stimuli (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981; Klein, 
1993); and the ability to multi-task (Palmeri et al., 2004) as working memory is free to deal with 
novel challenges. 
Functional and dysfunctional expertise 
The account of expertise above describes processing and competencies that clearly enhance 
the lives of those who have developed it, as these types of expertise allow more effective 
performance in functional, legitimate ways.  
 Conceptualising expertise as a continuum (Bedard & Chi, 1992; Chi, 2006) explains how 
most motivated novices can develop a level of knowledge and skill through learning and practice 
that affords a more cognitively economical and speedy execution of behaviour, be it learning a 
second language, learning to type, or diagnosing a brain tumor. That said, it is well-established that 
the majority of persistent offenders have grown up in impoverished conditions characterised by 
genetic, familial and environmental disadvantage (Farrington & Welsh, 2006). The chaotic and 
impoverished background of most offenders is unlikely to offer the neurological prerequisites 
desired to foster cognitive, behavioural and interpersonal competencies. Sufficient nutrition, rest, a 
stimulating and loving environment; ample opportunity to observe prosocial behaviour; consistent 
rewards for the incremental development of self-regulation and empathy for others; a childhood free 
from physical violence and access to toxic substances; are not the typical context of the child more 
likely to become an offender. These prerequisites of emotion regulation, impulse control and 
empathy are often sadly lacking (Liu, 2011; Nee & Ioannou, in press; Obradovic, 2010).  
 Despite these far from ideal circumstances, work in the nascent field of expertise in 
offenders is littered with examples of ways in which offenders’ decision-making, spatial navigation 
and execution of tasks is superior to a range of control groups, including students (Nee et al., 2015; 
Topalli, 2005), householders (Nee & Taylor, 2000) and other offenders (Logie, Wright & Decker, 
1992), albeit restricted to the domain of committing specific crimes1. Notwithstanding the impact 
that the amount or ‘dosage’ of disadvantage experienced in childhood can be, alongside the 
individual differences in response to adversity a child can have, and how these result in the 
development of maladaptive behaviour (Bonanno & Diminich, 2013; Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarrelli, 
& Vlahov, 2007), it is remarkable that a large proportion of those exposed to chronic adversity go 
on to lead functional and fulfilling lives (Masten & Netanaya, 2012; Rutter, 1985, 2006). While one 
could argue that chronic and persistent offenders are not in this (resilient) group, the age-crime 
curve (Loeber & Farrington, 2014) may in fact support this argument, if one views offending 
behaviour as a possible consequence of developmental delay (as a consequence of the adversity 
                                                          
1 However, this is not unusual as an established characteristic of expertise in general is that it is highly domain-limited 
(Gobet & Simon, 1996). 
noted above) and the fact that the majority of offenders have grown out of crime by their mid-
twenties. Unfortunately, experience within the Criminal Justice System (CJS) considerably 
increases the obstacles these young people face when attempting to adjust to ‘normal’ life, but as 
practitioners and academics involved in the reduction of crime we ignore these abilities to develop 
competencies in the face of considerable adversity at our peril.  
 
The nature of dysfunctional expertise and its potential role as a protective factor 
Nee and Ward (2015) have developed a theoretical model of ‘dysfunctional’ expertise as a 
way of explaining what is normally seen as a competency, but in offenders. What is compelling is 
that both functional and dysfunctional expertise share the same features (Nee & Ward, 2015). There 
is evidence that both involve the following stages of cognitive processing: 
 
1. Automatic, unintentional, pre-conscious appraisal of the environment that cannot be turned 
off; 
2. Superior, automatic recognition of the environmental, offence-related cues meaningfully 
related to the domain of expertise; 
3. The activation of complex cognitive schemas, built up through practice, allowing 
instantaneous, compensatory access to a rich number of exemplars and heuristics which will 
in turn guide; 
4. Speedy responses to environmental cues that have worked in the past in the form of the 
playing out of behavioural scripts, allowing a relatively automatic commission of the act. 
 
For offenders, most evidence comes from empirical work associated with decision-making 
in burglars (see Nee, 2015 for a review) but superior knowledge of cues, script-like knowledge and 
ease/automaticity of behaviour have been cited frequently in interview studies in the emerging 
literature, for example, implicit planning in child sex offenders and identity thieves (Ward & 
Hudson, 2000; Vieraitis, Copes, Powell & Pike, 2015) and use of automatic scripts in sex offenders 
(Bourke, Ward & Rose, 2012; Fortune, Bourke & Ward, 2015), firesetters (Butler & Gannon, 
2015), and carjackers (Topalli, Jacques & Wright, 2015).  
For example, in research using crime scene data, burglars are seen to use clean, systematic 
routes to and around the crime scene (indicating superior appraisal of cues and more script-like 
knowledge, Bernasco & Luykx, 2003) and this has been replicated in experiments in numerous 
studies in relation to control groups of householders and students who are slower and more 
haphazard in their search (Logie et al., 1992; Nee & Taylor, 2000; Rengert & Wasilchick, 2000; 
Wright, Logie & Decker, 1995). Target selection has been shown to be faster with the use of a 
fewer numbers of cues (Garcia-Retamero & Dhami, 2009; Homel, Macintyre & Wortley, 2014; Nee 
& Taylor, 2000; Snook, Dhami & Kavanagh, 2011). The more limited research on behaviour inside 
the target again exemplifies more economical cognitive processes built on prior learning including a 
faster, cleaner, more focused and more efficient searching for goods resulting in a greater net gain 
(Nee & Meenaghan, 2006; Nee et al., 2015; Wright & Decker, 1996). Burglars describe being on 
‘automatic pilot’ (Nee & Meenaghan, 2006) suggesting the triggering of automatic scripts based on 
dense schemas. The work completed on child molesters indicates a somewhat different array of 
expertise including covert and symbolic modelling, rehearsal, observational learning, and through 
an offender’s own experience of early sexual or physical abuse (Ward, 1999). Bourke et al.’s (2012) 
in-depth interviewing of a range of child sexual offenders suggested considerably more superior, 
automatic recognition of cues relating to vulnerable targets and contexts in the more experienced 
offenders. Rich schemas in memory were also described involving interconnected information 
about previous, current, and future victims. Individuals appeared to access these stores of 
knowledge and associated offending scripts when selecting strategies for current and future 
offenses. In sum, the study showed that expert child sexual offenders exhibited an enhanced ability 
to; detect emotional vulnerability of potential victims; avoid detection for offenses committed; 
effectively regulate and manage excessive emotional arousal; and have better problem-solving skills 
than less experienced offenders.  
Indeed, the unusual nature of expertise in offenders is that it can be envisaged as both a risk 
and protective factor. Moreover, a benefit is that unlike many of the risk and protective factors 
listed in the literature as associated with offending, there is a wealth of research and theory that 
aims to explain the nature of expertise (Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi et al., 1981; Klein, 1993), how it 
develops (Ericsson, 1996) and what its limitations are (Chi, 2006; Dror, 2011; Klein, 2009). 
Ericsson (2006) notes in the introductory chapter of the Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance that an expert is someone who is “widely recognised as a reliable source of 
knowledge, technique or skill whose judgment is accorded authority and status by the public or his 
peers” (p. 3). We do not ascribe these positive attributes to persistent offenders who are likely to 
have done considerable damage to their victims and themselves as a result of their periods of 
offending. Nevertheless, the competencies associated with their expertise are worth a closer look in 
order to unpick aspects which may be useful in helping them give up their dysfunctional behaviour.  
We know in a typically developing and well-adjusted child that at around three years of age 
the anterior cingulate cortex in the brain begins to play a crucial role in the development of impulse 
control and executive functioning in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Rueda, Posner & Rothbart, 
2005) and that this may be one of the key deficiencies in the development of the disadvantaged 
child (who may not be receiving appropriate nutrition, rest or security and may be subject to 
physical or emotional abuse or neglect). This renders them less able to control inbuilt impulses (i.e. 
to think before acting), especially when immediate reward is involved, and the resulting lack of 
self-regulation is known to be strongly correlated with a number of negative outcomes in 
adolescence and adulthood including psychopathology and antisocial behaviour (Dalley & Roiser, 
2012). Despite this problematic start, it must be acknowledged that many of the cognitive 
prerequisites for developing the competencies associated with expertise; a good working memory, 
ability for mental imagery, pattern recognition and sustained concentration; and ability for 
counterfactual thinking, planning and problem solving, appear to have developed at least to some 
extent in the offender. While the offender should not be congratulated for these abilities, in a 
strengths-based rehabilitation approach, it should be possible to recruit these competencies and 
work with them towards prosocial behaviours.  For example, the experienced child sex offender will 
have an enhanced ability to assess vulnerability in potential victims and will have developed 
considerable interpersonal skills in grooming the child. Bearing in mind his/her primary goal is 
likely to be the legitimate one of intimacy, these skills can be turned around into prosocial strategies 
for developing relationships with adults. Similarly, the heightened situational awareness of cues 
signifying vulnerable buildings characteristic of the burglar, bearing in mind his/her primary goal of 
needing to feed and clothe him/herself, could be successfully channelled into a legitimate role in 
environmental crime prevention. His/her ability to search buildings notably more effectively than a 
variety of novice groups could be used in such activities as bomb disposal.  In this way, the 
expertise developed can be used to underpin a growing sense of agency in the individual. If 
conceptualised like this, expertise can be seen as a naturally occurring 
strength/competency/protective factor which develops in spite of adversity and can be recruited to 
support desistance from crime. As a result of these features of expertise, and the ability of the 
disadvantaged young person to acquire them, we cannot afford to ignore it in the field of 
correctional psychology and criminology.  
 
Implications for rehabilitation and desistance  
 The current review has identified that it is important to understand more clearly the role of 
protective factors and how they should be conceptualised. The theoretical and practical implications 
for understanding protective factors are numerous and many have been mentioned above (e.g. 
implications for treatment and rehabilitation). Of particular importance to mention here is that 
protective factors and the positive approach of incorporating the offenders’ strengths into risk 
assessment corresponds with the Good Lives Model (GLM) of rehabilitation (Ward & Gannon, 
2006; Ward & Stewart, 2003). The GLM is a strengths-based approach that focuses on human 
agency by aiming to build capabilities within an offender in line with his/her existing values and 
interests. Additionally, it attempts to capitalise on an offender’s existing abilities and what s/he is 
already ‘good’ at (Ward & Fortune, 2013). In this sense, expertise has a valuable role to play given 
that many offenders will have already built up the competencies described above. The GLM 
recognises that offenders need to be sufficiently motivated to desist from crime (Ward & Stewart, 
2003) and therefore the GLM is concerned with helping the individual to formulate goals and 
construct plans based around eleven primary goods (e.g. life, knowledge, excellence in work, inner 
peace; Purvis, 2010; Ward & Brown 2004; Ward & Marshall, 2004). The GLM has been employed 
successfully to aid with the desistence of crime for various types of offenders, including sexual 
offenders (e.g. Ward & Fortune, 2013) and, more recently, residential burglars (e.g. Taylor, 2016). 
Taylor (2016) provides qualitative evidence of competencies in burglars and how they 
dysfunctionally map on to the primary human goods of life, excellence in work and excellence in 
agency, and how these could be harnessed in a strengths-based intervention. She demonstrates that 
it is lack of fulfilment of a particular primary good and/or the pursuit of a primary good that 
contributes towards the individual’s criminal activity; hence, if practitioners develop ‘good lives 
plans’ during case management and intervention that focus on the individual’s personal strengths 
and competencies, then this will help the offender to achieve the primary goods.   
The protective factors approach and in particular the notion of expertise as a protective 
factor can clearly be incorporated within the GLM to: (i) increase the sense of agency and 
consequent motivation to desist that this affords; (ii) support the offender in learning new 
(prosocial) skills; and (iii) assist the offender in reapplying the features of expertise from 
dysfunctional to functional within one or more areas of the primary goods. These new competencies 
will positively benefit the offender by reducing the need for the offender to achieve a ‘good life’ 
through criminal activity. That is, s/he will be able to pursue the eleven primary goods through 
more socially-acceptable means. For example, a residential burglar who has previously achieved the 
primary good of ‘life’ through obtaining money via stealing can instead achieve the primary good 
of ‘life’ through obtaining money via employment and a more secure standard of living. 
Furthermore, a residential burglar who has previously achieved the primary good of ‘knowledge’ 
through learning how to overcome complicated security measures, such as sophisticated or multiple 
locks, can instead achieve the primary good of ‘knowledge’ through developing new skills via 
studying or training. The overall aim of the GLM and the incorporation of expertise as a protective 
factor is to render the life of the offender more meaningful and productive. The offender will learn 
and identify the role that their criminal behaviour has in fulfilling the eleven primary goods, so can 
develop the skills to achieve these goods in a more pro-social manner; thus, desisting from 
offending. This ability to fulfil a ‘good life’ and show capability in something other than offending 
will promote positive well-being in the offender (Hefferon & Boniwell, 2011; Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and reduce  the risk of re-offending (Purvis, Ward & Willis, 2011). 
Knowledge of the cognitive features of expertise will present new hurdles in rehabilitation. 
The unconscious awareness of and selective attention for dysfunctional cues, and the automatic 
behavioural scripts these trigger will present a particular challenge for those who wish to give up 
criminal behaviour (or indeed any damaging behaviour) and for those wishing to assist them in this 
pursuit. Nevertheless, progress has been made in other fields in which damaging automatic 
processes and behaviours are a central feature. Evidence is accruing that dysfunctional automatic 
responses to meaningful triggers can be replaced by functional ones in the fields of; social 
discrimination; depression and anxiety; and eating behaviour (see Vernham & Nee, 2015 for more 
detail). These challenges, however, may be more than outweighed by the increased commitment 
and motivation afforded by taking the strengths-based approach.  
Importantly, the ability to develop these competencies despite adversity provides hope that 
there are nascent abilities in the most ill-fated young people and that these can be nurtured even 
before they start a life of crime. In the de Vries Robbé et al. (2015) model, these innate potentials 
for competency would be conceptualised as protective factors with a ‘motivator’ effect (i.e. 
potentials that support the development of other positive features). These ideas are also supported 
by recent theory and research on neural plasticity in brain development. Once thought to be at its 
peak in early childhood, scholars now propose that susceptibility to the impact of environmental 
adversity (or opposite) varies from individual to individual and may change throughout childhood 
and adolescence (Belsky et al., 2009; Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van 
Ijzendoorn, 2011).  
Thus, the influence of protective factors on prevention, rehabilitation and desistence has 
direct policy implications for the CJS and in particular crime prevention. Not only should risk 
factors continue to be a target of interventions, but so should protective factors. Through the 
inclusion of desistence and strengths, additional guidance will be in place during the assessment and 
intervention of those who offend, and by understanding expertise we can recognise those processes 
and behaviours that contribute to the development of offending behaviours. Therefore we can focus 
on adjusting these processes and behaviours into more adaptive and positive (i.e. socially-
acceptable) behaviours. By focusing on positive human change and development, we can avoid the 
negative labeling and unintended negative consequences that such labelling can produce (McNeil et 
al., 2012). That is, by incorporating both risk and protective factors in correctional practice, the 
predictive validity of assessments will improve and the planning of offender treatment programs 
will be more constructive meeting the needs of each individual offender. Hence, it is expected that 
in the long run reoffending rates will decrease when a positive approach is applied to offender 





Overall, more research is needed to disentangle the contribution of protective factors from 
those of risk factors, as well as to identify the role of specific protective factors in offending and the 
management strategies that are needed to enhance such factors. Further research should also explore 
the time frame in which protective factors play a role in desistence and whether this time frame is 
dependent on other factors, such as risk factors, offence characteristics or demographic factors. The 
more that is known about protective factors, the greater utility they will have in the assessment, 
management and treatment of individual offenders. Continuing research on expertise and its role in 
the rewards associated with crime and the sense of agency it affords will also help illuminate its role 
as both a risk and a protective factor in the development of criminal activity.  
 
Conclusion 
A better understanding of how and why people avoid, embark upon and desist from 
offending offers us the opportunity to develop better criminal justice practices, processes, policies, 
and helps us to provide more support for the offender during rehabilitation and reintegration into the 
community.  
What is apparent from this article is that, while there is clear evidence that offenders 
demonstrate competencies, we know very little about the nature of the skills, strengths and 
potentials young people at risk of offending might have, how these are related to agency and 
reward, and how they could be recruited in the prevention of and desistence from offending. It is 
hoped that this article will spark further research into protective factors, including expertise, to 
result in a broader evidence base for the prevention of offending and the assessment and treatment 
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